Module: sip-router Branch: master Commit: d34a464ba0c17f2189a20a72e95b314339ea6937 URL: http://git.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi/sip-router/?a=commit;h=d34a464b...
Author: Andrei Pelinescu-Onciul andrei@iptel.org Committer: Andrei Pelinescu-Onciul andrei@iptel.org Date: Fri Oct 15 11:47:51 2010 +0200
auth: minor log messages, comments and sanity fixes
- use sizeof(nc_t) when initializing a nonce count tracking entry (do not assume nc_t is char). This does not affect existing code. - removed a debugging ERR message - various minor comment fixes
---
modules/auth/nc.c | 4 ++-- modules/auth/nid.h | 4 ++-- modules/auth/nonce.c | 2 -- modules/auth/nonce.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/auth/nc.c b/modules/auth/nc.c index f2fc05c..671ef55 100644 --- a/modules/auth/nc.c +++ b/modules/auth/nc.c @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void destroy_nonce_count() * nc array corresponding to p. * WARNING: the result is an index in the nc_array converted to nc_t * (unsigned char by default), to get the index of the unsigned int in which - * nc is packed, call + * nc is packed, call get_nc_array_uint_idx(get_nc_array_raw_idx(i,p))). */ #define get_nc_array_raw_idx(i,p) \ (((i)&nc_partition_mask)+((p)<<nc_partition_k)) @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ nid_t nc_new(nid_t id, unsigned char p) do{ v=atomic_get_int(&nc_array[i]); /* new_value = old_int with the corresponding byte or short zeroed*/ - new_v=v & ~(((1<<(sizeof(nc_t)*8))-1)<< (r*8)); + new_v=v & ~(((1<<(sizeof(nc_t)*8))-1)<< (r*sizeof(nc_t)*8)); }while(atomic_cmpxchg_int((int*)&nc_array[i], v, new_v)!=v); return id; } diff --git a/modules/auth/nid.h b/modules/auth/nid.h index 837372a..995f37c 100644 --- a/modules/auth/nid.h +++ b/modules/auth/nid.h @@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ extern unsigned nid_pool_no; /* number of index pools */ * array locations it should be a number prime with the array size and * bigger then the cacheline. Since this is used also for onetime nonces * => NID_INC/8 > CACHELINE - * This number also limit the maximum pool/partition size, since the - * id overlfow checks check if crt_id - nonce_id >= partition_size*NID_INC + * This number also limits the maximum pool/partition size, since the + * id overflow check checks if crt_id - nonce_id >= partition_size*NID_INC * => maximum partition size is (nid_t)(-1)/NID_INC*/ #define NID_INC 257
diff --git a/modules/auth/nonce.c b/modules/auth/nonce.c index 369a41d..72c156a 100644 --- a/modules/auth/nonce.c +++ b/modules/auth/nonce.c @@ -406,8 +406,6 @@ int check_nonce(auth_body_t* auth, str* secret1, str* secret2, auth->digest.nc.len){ if (str2int(&auth->digest.nc, &nc)!=0){ /* error, bad nc */ - ERR("FIXME:check_nonce: bad nc value %.*s\n", - auth->digest.nc.len, auth->digest.nc.s); return 5; /* invalid nc */ } switch(nc_check_val(n_id, pf & NF_POOL_NO_MASK, nc)){ diff --git a/modules/auth/nonce.h b/modules/auth/nonce.h index 5dd85bf..2201b49 100644 --- a/modules/auth/nonce.h +++ b/modules/auth/nonce.h @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ union bin_nonce{
/* maximum nonce length in binary form (not converted to base64/hex): * expires_t | since_t | MD5(expires_t | since_t | s1) | \ - * MD5(info(auth_extra_checks, s2) => 4 + 4 + 16 + 16 = 40 bytes + * MD5(info(auth_extra_checks, s2)) => 4 + 4 + 16 + 16 = 40 bytes * or if nc_enabled: * expires_t | since_t | MD5...| MD5... | nonce_id | flag+pool_no(1 byte) * => 4 + 4 + 16 + 16 + 4 + 1 = 45 bytes
-
Andrei Pelinescu-Onciul