please start a new email each time you have a different topic, do not reply to old messages, otherwise the subject is misleading and the discussion gets in former email thread.
Use as first parameter "$fd" for proxy_authorize() and "$td" for www_authorize() (same for challenge counterpaths) -- you can see the kamailio.cfg shipped with 3.1. These were the implicit values taken when the parameter was empty in the older versions. 3.1 deliberately asks for the the parameter, the docs have to be updated.
Cheers, Daniel
On 10/24/10 10:44 PM, Sergey Okhapkin wrote:
I'm working on migration of my kamailio.cfg from v1.4 to 3.1 and stuck with weird problem:
0(25026) ERROR: auth_db [authdb_mod.c:236]: empty parameter 1 not allowed 0(25026) ERROR:<core> [route.c:1161]: fixing failed (code=-1) at cfg:/usr/local/etc/kamailio/kamailio.cfg.31:433 0(25026) ERROR:<core> [route.c:1161]: fixing failed (code=-1) at cfg:/usr/local/etc/kamailio/kamailio.cfg.31:438 0(25026) ERROR:<core> [route.c:1161]: fixing failed (code=-1) at cfg:/usr/local/etc/kamailio/kamailio.cfg.31:445 0(25026) ERROR:<core> [route.c:1161]: fixing failed (code=-1) at cfg:/usr/local/etc/kamailio/kamailio.cfg.31:445 0(25026) ERROR:<core> [route.c:1161]: fixing failed (code=-1) at cfg:/usr/local/etc/kamailio/kamailio.cfg.31:445 0(25026) ERROR:<core> [route.c:1161]: fixing failed (code=-1) at cfg:/usr/local/etc/kamailio/kamailio.cfg.31:451 ERROR: error -1 while trying to fix configuration
The complained lines are calls like
proxy_authorize("", "subscriber") proxy_challenge("", "0")
According to auth_db module documentation the "realm" parameter can be an empty string, but code in modules_k/auth_db/authdb_mod.c line 236 explicitly checks that parameter value must be non-empty.
On Sunday 24 October 2010, Daniel-Constantin Mierla wrote:
On 10/24/10 10:12 PM, Sergey Okhapkin wrote:
Correction - auth module is merged in 3.1, but auth_db modules are still separate.
yes, only auth modules were merged, like I wrote.
auth_db functions use return codes and API functions from auth module.
Cheers, Daniel
On Sunday 24 October 2010, Daniel-Constantin Mierla wrote:
probably omitted by mistake, but please keep the mailing list cc-ed.
On 10/24/10 3:38 PM, Sergey Okhapkin wrote:
Note that I check return code of www_authorize to be -1 (invalid user) and block IP in this case only. Other error codes should not block the IP address.
This one remembered me that in 3.1 we merged the auth modules and we used the one coming from ser because it has better nonce protection and other enhancements than kamailio version.
That means the return codes have changed, the new ones are listed now at: http://kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules_k/auth_db.html#id2753068
Added also note in migration wiki page: http://www.kamailio.org/dokuwiki/doku.php/install:3.0.x-to-3.1.0#modules _k_ auth_db
Cheers, Daniel
On Sunday 24 October 2010, you wrote:
I watched live an attack on voipuser.org while running 3.1 before release. It lasted 18 hours. I didn't want to ban it because was useful for testing and see if it reveals any weak. In most of the cases it hit pike module. I got some data and plan to make an article about it soon.
Anyhow, as a result of that, default config for kamailio has a section for detecting and banning such "bad" IPs, using pike to detect floods and htable to keep it blocked. Search WITH_ANTIFLOOD directive. It can be enhanced like you pointed here, so if the authorize fails, add the IP in the banned list stored in htable.
Using fail2ban together with IP tables has the advantage of dropping the packets before getting to application and eating cpu, although in the case of voipuser.org the cpu was not affected much - the rate was 170-200 requests per second.
Cheers, Daniel
On 10/24/10 3:06 PM, Sergey Okhapkin wrote: > I'm second for fail2ban. I block IP addresses with failed > registration attempts for 1 hour. Here is my setup: > > kamailio.cfg: > > if (is_method("REGISTER")) { > if(www_authorize("", "subscriber")< 0) { > if($rc == -1) { > xlog("L_INFO","Invalid username from > $proto:$si:$sp\n"); sl_send_reply("200","OK"); > } else > www_challenge("", "0"); > exit; > } > .... > > /etc/fail2ban/filter.d/openser.conf: > > [Definition] > #_daemon = kamailio > failregex = Invalid username from ...:<HOST>: > > /etc/fail2ban/jail.conf: > > findtime = 600 > > [openser-iptables] > enabled = true > filter = openser > action = iptables-allports[name=OPENSER, protocol=all] > logpath = /var/log/openser/openser # Replace with your sr log > location maxretry = 10 > bantime = 3600 > > On Sunday 24 October 2010, Uriel Rozenbaum wrote: >> Juha, >> >> I think we should be specially careful about black-lists. We receive >> many of these attacks in a per-day basis and a lot of them are from >> residential addresses or university, so I'm guessing some kind of >> worm or trojan performing the attack from various IPs. >> >> If you have the time, try fail2ban deamon. It can relate some >> brute-force events and act accordingly blocking an IP on iptables, >> executing a script. You send to "jail" those addresses for a period >> of time, then you can get them out again; and of course you can >> manually revert. >> >> Last, as a description of the attacks I saw, first it runs an NMAP >> like scan checking which IPs answer from 5060, then it starts >> sending registers (usually asterisk answers 404 if the user does not >> exist), then when the proxy challenges, it interprets the user is >> found and starts making dictionary attacks on the password (1234, >> admin, and so on). Keep safe complicated passwords, make kamailio >> challenge everything and you'll be safe. and again, fail2ban is a >> pretty good solution for brute force. >> >> This might help you finding a solution for your attacks. >> >> Cheers, >> Uriel >> >> On Sun, Oct 24, 2010 at 8:54 AM, Juha Heinanenjh@tutpro.com
wrote:
>>> while doing some tests, i noticed that one of my proxies started to >>> receive lots of register requests with different user names >>> starting from a letter. there was also invite attempts in the >>> logs. they came from ip 202.82.16.99 which according to traceroute >>> is somewhere in china. >>> >>> should we start publishing a black list of these attack ip >>> addresses? >>> >>> -- juha >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing >>> list sr-users@lists.sip-router.org >>> http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users >> _______________________________________________ >> SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing >> list sr-users@lists.sip-router.org >> http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users > _______________________________________________ > SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing > list sr-users@lists.sip-router.org > http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users
SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing list sr-users@lists.sip-router.org http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users
SIP Express Router (SER) and Kamailio (OpenSER) - sr-users mailing list sr-users@lists.sip-router.org http://lists.sip-router.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/sr-users