I've been doing some experimentation with t_any_timeout() and t_branch_timeout(), and I've observed they return true if either the initial invite receives no response, or if the 200 OK is not acknowledged by the UAC.

Is there any way of differentiating between these scenarios? 

Thanks
 

On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 12:57 AM, Marrold <kamailio@marrold.co.uk> wrote:
Hi Charles, 

I can confirm that t_any_timeout(), and t_branch_timeout() return true when these un-ACKd transactions occur.

I just needed to make sure that I set a failure route, in my reply route.

Thanks for the tip.

On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Charles Chance <charles.chance@sipcentric.com> wrote:

Hi,

You should probably check out TM docs - specifically failure route (http://kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules/tm.html#tm.f.t_on_failure) and t_is_expired (http://kamailio.org/docs/modules/stable/modules/tm.html#tm.f.t_is_expired).

From there you can do what you like.

Cheers,

Charles

On 5 Apr 2016 1:22 p.m., "Marrold" <kamailio@marrold.co.uk> wrote:
I am interested in 'fingerprinting' various SIP scanner attacks and using them to intelligently block attacks, rather than just blindly black listing any SIP message to a honey pot. 

Additionally I think it would be wise to detect these missing ACKs and/or incomplete transactions from a legitimately mis-configured or malfunctioning end point, to help protect the core network from needless re-transmissions.

Having checked the Asterisk logs, this is what I'm looking to block if a certain threshold is exceeded-

[2016-04-05 13:10:52] WARNING[2010] chan_sip.c: Retransmission timeout reached on transmission eff430b8c1b6d21c2058049f41a7ec57 for seqno 1 (Critical Response)   

Thanks


On Tue, Apr 5, 2016 at 1:14 PM, Daniel Tryba <d.tryba@pocos.nl> wrote:
On Tue, Apr 05, 2016 at 12:09:29AM +0100, Marrold wrote:
> I have been running a couple of Asterisk honey pots to get a better
> understanding of the tools and methods potential hackers are using to
> exploit SIP servers.
>
> I have observed many attacks from the 'sipcli' user agent that don't send
> ACKs.
[...]
> Please could anyone point me in the right direction to detect these non
> completed calls with a missing ACK in Kamailio? I am unsure on the
> terminology I should be using to search the online documentation.

Why do you care? The attacker doesn't care about receiving SIP messages,
they are only interested in initiating a call to a target, if the target
gets dialled you will be abused, by either an other source with a fully
function SIP stack or just something that might be spoofed.

What I do is blacklist addresses that send any SIP messages to my
honeypots, might be dangerous since with UDP anything can be spoofed (so
better make sure you have a whitelist and there is no connection between
the honeypots and your client facing SIP platform)

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